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The article provides a theoretical framework of international unions in the form of two two-
stage games with discounting and one simultaneous game aimed at generating insights into 
the conflict between widening and deepening in the integration process. Each country (player) 
has a preference for a set of regulations (policies). Regulatory differences between countries 
cause utility loss. Harmonization reduces the utility loss but entails a cost since it requires 
union members to implement harmonized rules that may deviate from the country’s preferred 
regulation. Insiders harmonize a subset of the regulations. Widening signifies that outsiders 
join the union by accepting the union’s harmonized set of regulations - which is beneficial for 
the insiders. Deepening means that insiders proceed to harmonize a larger subset of 
regulations. We inquire whether widening should precede deepening, or vice versa, or 
whether it is preferable to interchange widening and deepening in some incrementally 
prescribed manner. The incentive to pursue further regulatory harmonization within a union 
increases with the regulatory diversity among insiders certeris paribus, provided the effect of 
outsiders on the utility of insiders is small. Insiders are more reluctant to opt for widening 
before deepening the more the mean regulatory preference of insiders deviates from the mean 
regulatory preference of outsiders in areas likely to become harmonized in the future. In 
contrast, members are more inclined to choose widening before deepening the more the mean 





One central tenet of political economy is that a government’s decision to pursue economic 
and political integration involves a trade-off between political autonomy and economic 
efficiency in the provision of public goods. In a pathbraking contribution, Alberto Alesina and 
Enrico Spolaore (2003; 1997) have argued that the size of nations crucially depends on the 
cost of government, the heterogeneity of political preferences and the alternatives to political 
centralization of public good provisions.1 Along similar lines, Casella (2001:83) has claimed 
that “the optimal number of jurisdictions is unique and increases with market size,” and 
Bolton and Roland (1997:1057) have suggested that “separation occurs in equilibrium…when 
income distributions vary across regions and the efficiency gains from unification are small,” 
but that “all incentives for separation disappear…when all factors of production are perfectly 
mobile.” Finally, Wittman (1991) has similarly stated that the unification and dissolution of 
nation states is driven by wealth maximization considerations. While larger nations can 
produce public goods more efficiently, smaller political entities possess a higher level of 
political autonomy and thus find it easier to provide a level of public goods finely attuned to 
local preferences. 
International unions often offer a superior and indeed more obvious alternative to increasing 
the size of nations (Alesina, Angeloni and Etro 2001, 2005). Unions allow optimizing the 
provision of public goods. Their members choose to collectively provide only a select set of 
public goods, leaving the provision of all other policies and regulation in the hands of 
individual member states; unions thereby increase the aggregate utility of union members.2 
Thus, the policies, regulations and public goods provided by any union are very much 
                                                 
1 Alesina and Spolaore (1997) argued that democratization leads to secessions which, together with 
international economic integration, imply an inefficiently large number of countries. Alesina and 
Spolaore (2003) proceeded to “argue that the optimal size of a country is determined by a cost-benefit 
trade-off between the benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity.” More specifically, “in a large 
country, per capita costs may be low, but the heterogeneous preferences of a large population make it 
hard to deliver services and formulate policy. Smaller countries may find it easier to respond to citizen 
preferences in a democratic way.” 
2   Such processes can lead to a separation of the historically related concepts of government and 
territoriality; see Frey 2001.  
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reflective of the preferences and capacities of its members. As a consequence, the widening of 
union is typically a conflictual process. As an example, Plümper and Schneider (2007) find 
that “EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers 
and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly 
higher than in member countries.” They further show “that EU members are more likely to 
demand a discrimination of new members if distributional conflicts arise.” 
Adding new members may well give rise to periods of uncertainty and turbulence, especially 
if it is revealed that certain policy preferences of new members deviate from the preferences 
of old members. If newcomers pressure for change, enlargement may well lead to a ‘new kind 
of union’.3 Old members thus must carefully consider to what extent the utility boost they 
experience due to enlargement may be offset by future changes in union policies that reflect 
solely the desires of newcomers. 
Our study offers a first comprehensive theoretical framework to tackle such issues and seeks 
to understand a series of related questions regarding the varying relationships between 
widening and deepening.4 We define widening as increase in the number of union members 
and deepening as harmonizing an additional set of regulations within a union.  
This article provides systematic formal content that permits disciplined discussion of 
widening and deepening. Our study models the trade-off between widening and deepening of 
a union not only in a static but also in a dynamic perspective. In a static perspective, our 
model posits that the members of a union have a positive incentive to widen a union since the 
newcomers are required (by the terms of the accession agreement) to implement the 
harmonized policies of the union. Focusing exclusively on deepening causes on the one hand 
the benefit of reduced regulatory diversity between union members, but on the other hand 
causes harmonization costs.  
                                                 
3  Time Europe magazine, 23th December 2002. 
4  Recent analyses of the enlargement process include Cremona 2003; Kandogan 2000, Karp and Bowler 
2006, König and Bräuninger 2002; Steunenberg 2002, Streit and Voigt 1997; Plümper, Schneider and 
Troeger 2006, Schneider 2005. 
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The dynamic perspective is modeled as two two-stage games with a discount factor for the 
second stage. With zero discounting, the two stages are equally influential, raising most 
starkly complicated issue of whether the members prefer ‘widening before deepening’ to 
‘deepening before widening’ or vice versa. The model provides a tool that implies normative 
recommendations about union formation. Future research may test the model empirically 
against actual cases of union formation. 
Our model reveals a fundamental trade-off that old members face: the trade-off between 
maintaining full control over future developments of the union, in particular the regulatory 
harmonization agenda, and the gains members derive from having newcomers incorporate 
union regulations and policies. We show that this trade-off is affected by the degree of 
preference heterogeneity between insiders and potential newcomers. Union members are 
likely to choose ‘widening before deepening’ if a) the number of regulations and policies 
awaiting harmonization is relatively low in comparison to the number of already harmonized 
policies, b) if members largely discount future pay-offs and c) if further deepening reduces the 
union’s attractiviness for outsiders. In addition, our model also shows that insiders can 
enhance the attraction of the ‘widening before deepening’ option to them through 
discrimination; that is, by limiting the voice granted to newcomers, insiders may secure 
continuing maximum influence over Union business. However, such influence would come at 
the cost of reducing the appeal of membership to outsiders. Nevertheless, flexible 
membership provides an attractive instrument to distribute the gains from enlargement more 
evenly between accession countries and old members. 
Members of international unions have typically been aware of this trade-off. The opening of 
EU enlargement negotiations in the late 1990s with applicant countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe raised the perennial question whether a wider Union would also mean a 
weaker and shallower union. Many believed that a more integrated union was likely to 
become more difficult to achieve as the number of EU-member countries grew as a result of 
 6 
eastward enlargement. The choice seemed clear: widening the EU would require current 
members to abandon efforts for deeper integration, while further deepening would be possible 
only at the expense of further enlargement. Others dismissed the view that posits a trade-off 
between widening and deepening, arguing instead that the two processes are inter-twined; 
with proper preparation deepening renders widening possible and enlargement makes further 
deepening desirable. In short, this alternative view holds that the two processes feed on each 
other.  
The EU Commission clearly subscribes to the latter view. It considers enlargement as 
perfectly compatible with the deepening process of integration; enlargement may even 
reinforce deepening. This belief is based on the Commission’s ‘positive-sum’ game 
conception of east-ward enlargement. The mutual benefits are said to be many: First, the 
extension of the zone of peace, stability, and prosperity in Europe could enhance the security 
of all its people; second, the addition of more than 100 million people, in rapidly growing 
economies, to the EU’s market of 370 million is said to boost economic growth and create 
jobs in both old and new member countries;5 third, stringent EU regulations (policies) for 
protection of the environment and the fight against crime, drugs, and illegal immigration are 
expected to improve the quality of life of both new and old member-states; fourth, the arrival 
of new members is likely to enrich the EU through increased cultural diversity, interchange of 
ideas, and better understanding of other peoples; finally, enlargement may strengthen the 
Union’s role in world affairs – in foreign and security policy, trade policy, and other fields of 
global governance. 
The Commission’s belief that deepening goes hand in hand with widening may have been 
strenghtened, in part, by past experience. Past experience, however, is not necessarily a valid 
                                                 
5  A study by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (“The Economic Impact of 
Enlargement,” May 2001) estimated that enlargement could increase growth of GDP of the acceding 
countries by between 1.3 and 2.1 percentage points annually, and for the existing members it could 
increase the level of GDP by 0.7 percentage points on a cumulative basis; for a similarly positive 
assessment, see R. Baldwin, J.F. François, and R. Portes, “The Costs and Benefits of Eastern 
Enlargement,” Economic Policy 24, 1997. 
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guide for the future. Guérot (2002) pointedly notes: “For years, the EU has tried to widen and 
deepen in parallel. But since the treaty of Maastricht took effect in 1992, the deepening 
progress has stumbled, puttering ahead with the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, but making 
little real process. The widening process, however, is moving ahead briskly.” The treaty of 
Amsterdam of 1997 retained the unanimity rule in most areas. The only institutional 
modifications in the treaty were some reinforcements of the power of the President of the 
Commission and extensions of the powers of the Parliament. The key institutional issues, 
however, remained untouched: the size of the college of commissioners, the re-weighting of 
votes, the extension of qualified majority voting in the Council, and other issues relating to 
binding decision-making. Similarly, the Nice treaty, has been faulted for introducing a 
byzantine and highly inefficient decision-making mechanism (triple majority requirement) 
bound to lead to institutional gridlocks as the Union expands (Baldwin et al. 2001). 
This last point puts the finger squarely on what is clearly the critical weakness of the extant 
literature on the widening-deepening debate: it is highly contextual, contingent, speculative, 
and analytically tenuous. The paucity of extensive and compelling theoretical discussions on 
this central and highly timely question is striking and puzzling alike.6 Even if we accept that 
for most of the Community’s history widening and deepening were compatible, we cannot 
assume that this will always be the case. Instead, we need to theoretically work out the 
conditions under which harmony rather than incompatibility or tension between the two 
processes is likely to hold. When and why do trade-offs emerge between widening and 
deepening? And what are the implications of these trade-offs with regards to the sequencing 
of deepening and widening; that is, when should deepening precede widening or vice-versa? 
When should states opt for deepening and forget about enlarging the union; and when is a 
strategy of widening-only more sensible? The study provides answers to the questions raised 
                                                 
6  The only explicitly analytical treatment of the widening-deepening question in the social sciences is by 
Brewster, Munger, and Oatley (2002). They show that widening need not be inconsistent with 
deepening as long as a union is endowed with strong central institutions with pro-union proclivities. 
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above. It is organized as follows: section 2 states the model’s assumptions; sections 3 and 4 
set the stage for the analysis in section 5 of the implications of different scenarios of 
interactions between widening and deepening by clarifying the meaning of widening and 
deepening, as well as stating the costs of regulatory harmonization. Section 6 considers in 
greater detail the utility function of outsiders and the implications of such utility specification. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Assumptions of the Model 
The model we develop in this section posits, similarly to a recent model by Alesina, Angeloni, 
and Etro (2001, 2005), that unions exist because they generate gains from the harmonization 
of regulation (policy). Alesina et al. model unions as groups of countries deciding to 
centralize the provision of public goods – or rules, regulations, and policies – that generate 
externalities across union members. The trade-off between the benefits of coordination and 
the loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition and scope 
of unions. Policy uniformity reduces the size of unions, may block the entry of new members 
and induces excessive centralization. Alesina et al. argue that “[t]he size of spillovers between 
countries and the heterogeneity between their preferences or their economic fundamentals 
determines endogenously the size of the union and its composition” (Alesina et al. 2001: 4).7 
We build on this insight and offer an analysis that goes one step further. Rather than analyzing 
union formation as a single shot game in which countries simultaneously determine the 
union’s membership size and its level of integration, we are interested in understanding the 
dynamic process of growth of a union through widening (enlargement) and deepening. 
Our model makes five assumptions. How these are reflected in the model becomes clearer as 
we proceed. First, gains derive from harmonizing a subset of regulations. Second, 
harmonization entails costs, notably loss of regulatory autonomy and the cost of implementing 
                                                 
7  See also Brou and Ruta 2004; Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht 2005.  
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union-wide reforms that may not be optimally tailored to a country’s needs. These costs can 
be negative. Third, we assume that the union’s choice of a harmonized regulation is the 
weighted average of the union members’ preference regarding that regulation.8 Fourth, we 
take the existence of an original union with a specified number of harmonized regulations as 
exogenously given. The original union is composed of ‘old’ members, also called insiders; 
accession countries are outsiders who have applied for union membership. This assumption 
allows us to make a variety of different starting points for our analysis. Fifth, accession 
countries must accept and faithfully implement all union regulations in order to become full 
members. 
Consider now M+N countries and a set of H+K regulations. The model poses no upper or 
lower limits about the generality of regulations. A general regulation can be subsidy to 
agriculture. A specific regulation can be the amount of insulation in lamps to prevent fire.  
Each country i has implemented a regulation k denoted rik  [0,1], k=1,…,H+K. The scaling 
of rik means that zero and one are extreme regulations. For example, rik=0 may mean zero 
tolerance for immigration, and rik=1 may mean complete tolerance for immigration. Each 
country i assigns different issue salience and thus weights wik to the various regulations. 









  (1) 
This constraint ensures that the aggregate influence of each country, across all regulations, is 
equal. Let us assume further that M countries have formed a union, harmonizing H of their 
regulations. A harmonized regulation k is expressed as ( )kr M , which means that country i 
has adjusted from rik to ( )kr M . A country with a large weight wik in regulation k has greater 
                                                 
8  We posit constant weights throughout the analysis. 
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influence on ( )kr M  than a country with a small weight. The union choice of regulation is 



















where 0ikp   is the bargaining power of country i for regulation k. For example, 1kp =0 
means that country 1 has no power in the determination of harmonized regulation k, which 
means that 1kr  has no impact on ( )kr M . Conversely, 1kp    means that country 1 has 
infinitely large power in the determination of harmonized regulation k, which means that 
( )kr M = 1kr , provided that all other countries have finitely large power. In our formulation, the 
outcome of the bargaining is determined by regulation preferences, the issue salience attached 
to each regulation and the relative bargaining power of union members.  
 
Taking M and H as given, the model has two endogenously determined variables. These are 
which m additional countries shall join the union, and which h additional regulations shall be 
harmonized. m and h are not strategic choice variables chosen by the M+N countries, but 
follow from individual utility maximization by each of the M+N countries. The richness of 
such an approach is that based on five simple and plausible assumptions, we can actually 
predict which subset of countries will join the union, and which subset of regulations will be 
harmonized. A tool for such prediction is valuable for policy makers and others who seek to 
understand membership and harmonization for unions. 
 
                                                 
9  We can let the union impact rk by summing from 0 to M where w0k and r0k are the union weight and 
regulation preference, and where the union weights in contrast to equation (1) may sum to a number 
between 0 and infinity. See Alesina, Angeloni and Etro 2001 for a more comprehensive discussion of 
decision-making mechanisms.  
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The implication of the endogenously determined m and h is that the union’s regulation choice  
is endogenously determined by the insiders for each regulation k=1,…,H+K. Hence the 
union’s regulation choice depends on the members, the non-members, the harmonized 
regulations, and the unharmonized regulations. The union’s choice of a common regulation can 
be perceived as occurring through a standard voting process where each country reports its 
preference, or by a team of administrators researching and communicating with contries to 
clarify their preferences. The design of the union’s regulation choice is on the one hand 
mechanical, but is on the other hand, we believe, descriptive of how a union regulation gets 
established as a weighted average of member preferences. 
 
We prefer not to let each country choose its regulation rik strategically. First, most countries 
have usually established regulations in most policy areas, determined domestically and 
usually entrenched through time prior to union emergence. Second, if countries were to 
announce rik strategically, based on everyone’s announcement and the game characteristics, 
credibility problems arises since a country may announce rik in the hope of getting a certain 
regulation as a union member, or announce a fictive rik and revert to its preferred rik if it does 
not become a union member. Third, countries’ regulations are usually widely observable, 
which complicates bargaining when countries try to reconcile observed and announced 
preferences among each other. However, in principle and theoretically strategic choice of rik is 
straightforward to incorporate into the model and means that each country chooses rik to 
maximize utility. 
 
After a union has been established, an interesting question for the outsiders is whether they 
would benefit from harmonization. They may harmonize the same regulations to the union’s 
choice or to some other common regulation they prefer, or harmonize a subset or larger set of the 
union’s harmonized regulations, or they may establish a second union. All these possibilities for 
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the outsiders create new externalities for the established union which are straightforward to 
analyze with this model. 
 
3. The Comparative Statics of the Model: Three Simple Scenarios 
In this and the following section we set the stage for the subsequent analysis (see section 5) of 
the implications of different scenarios of interactions between widening and deepening. We 
first clarify the meaning of widening as well as deepening and then analyze more fully the 
costs of pursuing union-wide harmonization of regulations. The section begins with a model 
of the union status quo and then examines how widening and deepening affect the utility of 
union members. 
3.1. ‘Do Nothing’: The Status Quo 
Forming a union entails harmonizing a certain set of rules and regulations among member 
states. Harmonization requires compromise, that is, willingness to embrace a regulation that 
may be collectively optimal but individually suboptimal for each country. Countries face a 
trade-off between keeping their preferred national regulations (and thus not paying the price 
of compromise) and agreeing on joint regulatory standards that may deviate from their 
preferred regulations (and thereby partake in the general gains of a union formation).  
Figure 1b shows the utility of one country i which is member of a union of M countries with 
H harmonized regulations.  We assume that M+N countries exist in total and that these could 
harmonize H+K regulations (see Figure 1a).  
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Fig. 1a: Harmonized regulations H among M 
members of the union 
Figure 1b: The utility loss of regulatory 
diversity, decomposed 
 
Harmonization implies that country i has changed rik to ( )kr M . We standardize our model so 
that by assumption the net utility of these harmonization measures is nil. In other words, gains 
and costs associated with past harmonization exercises are sunk, and country i keeps the same 
weight wik for regulation k before and after harmonization. 
Figure 1b considers the cost of country i – an insider. This country experiences utility loss due 
to three kinds of regulatory diversity. The lower-left cell is easiest to understand: Since the M 
insiders have agreed on the harmonization of H regulations, the regulatory diversity is zero. 
However, we also assume that K non-harmonized regulations exist.10 The upper-left cell sums 
up the regulatory diversity in these regulations over the M members of the union. The cell in 
the lower-right sums up the regulatory diversity between insiders and N outsiders for 
harmonized regulations, which is why the diversity is determined relative to ( )kr M . Finally 
the upper-right cell sums up the regulatory diversity between insiders and N outsiders for non-
harmonized regulations, which is why the diversity is determined relative to rik. In short, we 
get 
1 1 1 1 1 1
M H K M N H M N H K
i ik ik jk ik k jk ik ik jk
j , j i k H j M k j M k H
u w r r w r ( M ) r w r r
  
   
          
            . (3) 
                                                 
10  See Casella and Frey 1992 for a more detailed discussion of ‘overlapping jurisdictions’.  
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Equation (3) implies that country i may increase its utility by expanding the size of the union 
from M to M+N and by increasing the integration level of the union by increasing the set of 
harmonized regulations from H to H+K. Hence, country i can increase its utility by 
iu . 
3.2.  Widen: Increase the Number of Members  
We now turn to considering partial widening, that is, the acceptance by the union of some 
new members. Thus assume that m1 of the N outsiders join the union and become insiders, 
resulting in M+m insiders. In our model, accession countries must accept the regulations of 
the insiders to qualify for full membership (Mattli, Plümper 2004; and Plümper, Schneider, 
Troeger 2006). By accepting the H harmonized regulations, accession countries change their 
H regulations rjk to ( )kr M , as shown in Figures 2a and 2b: 
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Fig. 2a: Harmonized regulations H among 
M+m members of the union 




Insiders benefit from widening because it eliminates regulatory diversity in the accession 
countries, leaving the cost of convergence on H harmonized regulations with the newcomers. 
By replacing M with M+m and keeping M+N (the total number of countries) in (3), we obtain 
1 1 1 1 1 1
M m H K M N H M N H K
im ik ik jk ik k jk ik ik jk
j , j i k H j M m k j M m k H
u w r r w r ( M ) r w r r
  
    
            
             (4) 




im i ik k jk
j M k




     (5) 
The simplicity of equation (5) follows from the sum of the first and third terms in (3) which 
equals the sum of the first and third terms in (4). Therefore, equation (5) is always positive. 
Since we assume that accepting new members is free of cost for the M insiders, widening the 
union is always beneficial for them. Country i’s utility increase caused by m additional union 
members depends on the number H of harmonized regulations, the regulatory diversity 
between ( )kr M  for country i and rjk for the m new members, and the weight wik assigned to 
each regulation. The more diverse the outsiders’ regulations before union enlargement, the 
larger the number of harmonized regulations within the union prior to accession, and the 
greater the weights assigned to these union regulations, the bigger the gains from enlargement 
for country i. Our model thus states the obvious, namely that union insiders always gain from 
widening if no additional harmonization is intended or feasible. Note that this result depends 
on the assumption that widening of a union does not lead to a re-negotiation of pre-
harmonized regulations. This assumption certainly is valid for the European Union (Plümper 
et al. 2006), but does not need to apply for all unions at all times.  
3.3. Deepen: Increase the number of Harmonized Regulations 
Our next step is to illustrate deepening. As shown in Figures 3a and 3b, deepening means 
increasing the number of harmonized regulations from H to H+h, while holding membership 
constant. 
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Fig. 3a: Harmonized regulations H+h among 
M members of the union 
Figure 3b: The utility loss of regulatory 
diversity, decomposed 
 
Deepening changes the utility of country i as follows.  
1 1 1 1 1 1
M H K M N H h M N H K
ih ik ik jk ik k jk ik ik jk
j , j i k H h j M k j M k H h
u w r r w r ( M ) r w r r
  
    
            
             (6) 
Let us compare equations (6) and (3) term by term. Subtracting (3) from (6) gives 
1 1 1 1
H h M M N M N
ih i ik ik jk ik k jk ik ik jk
k H j , j i j M j M
u u w r r w r ( M ) r w r r
  
  
       
 
       
 
    . (7) 
where we have placed the sum from H+1 to H+h outside the bracket. The first term equals the 
first term in (6) minus the first term in (3). The second term equals the second term in (6) 
minus the second term in (3). The third term equals the third term in (6) minus the third term 
in (3). The first term is always positive. The reason is that deepening from H to H+h causes 
reduced regulatory diversity between the M insiders, which is always beneficial. The second 
term is always negative and must be seen in relation to the third term which is always 
positive. The second and third terms cancel when ( )kr M = ikr . When ik jkr r > k jkr ( M ) r , 
deepening causes insider i’s regulation to move closer to the regulation of outsider j. This 
causes reduced regulatory diversity so that the second and third terms together are positive, 
which is beneficial for insider i. In other words, since the average deviation between insider i 
and outsider j can either increase or decrease, the second and third terms can be negative or 
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positive. The term is positive (negative) if the average deviation from the outsiders’ regulation 
decreases (increases).  
Equation (7) is positive or negative for country i depending on i’s regulatory preferences 
relative to the preferences of other union members –i and those of j. The effect of outsiders’ 
regulations on union members’ utility depends on the diversity between the union’s point of 
agreement kr (M)  and the mean position kr (N)  of the outsiders in that regulation, which is 
calculated as in (2) by substituting M with N for the N outsiders. This suggests that insiders 
may find it difficult to increase the number of harmonized regulations if outsiders on average 
have preferences that largely deviate from the agreement point of insiders and if the 
regulations of outsiders are relatively important for the utility of insiders (which in our model 
may be the case if the number of outsiders is large, implying big outside market size).  In this 
case, a subset of insiders will oppose additional harmonization unless they are compensated 
by insiders enjoying positive externalities. This implies that the incentive of further 
harmonization is larger if the regulatory diversity amongst insiders is also large and if 
outsiders have a small effect on the utility of union members. Yet, this result presumes that 
regulatory reforms are either costless or that costs are fixed. If, however, reforms are costly 
and increase in regulatory diversity, the influence of preference heterogeneity on deepening is 
less clearcut. We discuss increasing costs in the following section. 
 
4. Costs of Regulatory Reforms 
We noted earlier that the cost of harmonization increases with the diversity between a 
country’s old optimal regulation and the union’s harmonized regulation. We express the cost 
for country i of adjusting to union regulation as ( )k ikr M r

 , suggesting equal cost for all 
regulations and countries (where  >0 is a parameter). Since ( )kr M  and rik are between zero 
and one, setting 0 1   means that small regulatory reform is relatively more expensive 
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than large regulatory reform; large reforms cost more in absolute terms and less in relative 
terms. Conversely, 1   implies that small regulatory reform is relatively cheaper than large 
regulatory reform. The cost of regulatory reform affects the utilities of the insiders only in the 
case of deepening, not when widening. Hence the utility for widening imu  in (4) remains 
unchanged while the utility for deepening ihu  in (6) is replaced by 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
M H K M N H h M N H K
ih ik ik jk ik k jk ik ik jk
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 (8) 
where the last term is the cost to country i of harmonizing h regulations, given starting point 
at (M,H), and where 0   is a unit cost term that scales the last term relative to the other 
terms. 
Countries have more to win if regulatory diversity before agreement is large. However, 
members with outlier regulatory preferences face steep adjustment costs. Therefore, the 
probability that some insiders may lose from further harmonization will increase with 
heterogeneity. In short, further harmonization is less likely the larger the regulatory diversity 
among union members unless the winners from additional harmonization (those countries 
with regulation preferences close the union’s point of agreement) compensate potential losers. 
The odds for further harmonization also depend on 0  .  
While equation (7) is always positive and equation (8) is positive for some members and 
negative for others, the cost term is negative for all union members with the exception of 
those members whose regulation preference are identical to the union’s point of agreement. 
Hence, the cost term is strictly non-positive. This discussion, again leads to a very 
straightforward conclusion, namely that union members are more likely to increase the 
number of harmonized regulations if the heterogeneity of regulation preferences among union 
members is small. This result apparently is more in line than the prediction of a model that 
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does not make the assumption that bargaining costs increase in preference heterogeneity. 
More specifically, our model suggests that since the gains from harmonization are larger the 
more countries join the union while the costs of harmonization for each actor country depend 
solely on the difference between the country’s preferred policy and the union’s point of 
agreement, the number of union members critically influences harmonization of controversial 
policies. This leads to the counterintuitive finding, namely that union members are more likely 
to harmonize controversial policies and regulations, the larger the number of union members. 
This claim, however, holds if and only if gains from harmonization rise faster than the 
bargaining cost of negotiations in a diverse union. And it requires decision rules which either 
allow non-unanimity decisions or multiple issue-linkages in bargaining situations in which 
members can trade concessions. In these cases, this finding leads to the identification of a 
fundamental, but obvious trade-off: The more members a union has, the more likely they are 
to harmonize a controversial policy. Unfortunately, larger unions tend to be more 
heterogeneous. This trade-off gives rise to an optimal union size – a notion that we do not 
further analyze in this article.  
 
5. The Model in Dynamic Perspective:  
Two More Complicated Scenarios 
Members of international unions seeking to deepen integration and expand regionally face the 
difficult question of whether widening shall precede deepening, or vice versa, or whether it is 
preferable to interchange widening and deepening in some incrementally prescribed manner. 
In this section, we analyze the implications of different sequencing scenarios with the aim of 
deriving a set of hypotheses regarding the desirability of these scenarios. To simplify, we 
confine attention to the most straightforward and common dynamic extension, which is a two 
period game. We consider two scenarios, which are ‘widening before deepening’ and 
‘deepening before widening’, which we compare with the simultaneous choice of widening 
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and deepening. Each country compares its utility across these three exogenously determined 
games, and it can be observed which union gets established and which regulations get 
harmonized. 
Let us specify the extensive form of the three games. Starting from M and H, the countries 
jointly choose m and h through individual utility maximization. In the simultaneous static 
game, all countries take M and H, and in particular ( )kr M , as given when they simultaneously 
make choices that transform the union from (M,H) to (M+m,H+h). 
In the game ‘widening before deepening’, before the first stage all M countries take M, H, and 
( )kr M , as given and make simultaneous choices that transform the union from (M,H) to 
(M+m,H). Before the second stage all M+m countries take M+m, H, and ( )kr M m , as given 
and make simultaneous choices that transform the union from (M+m,H) to (M+m,H+h).  
In the game ‘deepening before widening’, before the first stage all M countries take M, H, and 
( )kr M , as given and make simultaneous choices that transform the union from (M,H) to 
(M,H+h). Before the second stage all M countries take M, H+h, and ( )kr M , as given and 
make simultaneous choices that transform the union from (M,H+h) to (M+m,H+h).  
 
5.1. Widening Before Deepening  
We begin our analysis of the first scenario – widening before deepening - assuming that 
widening has a utility uim given by equation (4). We discount the subsequent deepening with a 
discount parameter d , 0 1d  . Subsequent deepening means that the M+m insiders keep 






ik ik i ik ik ik
i i M
k M M m
ik ik i ik ik
i i M
p r p w r
r M m














which reduces to (2) when 0i  . The parameters d  and i  are the only di¤erence with the 
static case. Generally, 0 1i  . When 1i  , each of the m newcomers has the same voting 
power and influence on ( )kr M m  as the M original insiders. This means that the political 
influence of members is independent of their membership duration and depends solely on the 
individual weight and salience they assign to the m regulations. Conversely, 0i   describes 
a situation where insiders discriminate maximally against newcomer number i by allowing it 
no influence in determining the h additional regulations. Scaling i  between zero and one 
allows for “discriminatory widening” in the sense that new insiders can be given some degree 
of influence on ( )kr M m . As i  increases from zero to one, joining a union becomes more 
attractive for outsiders because future costs of harmonization are likely to decline as the 
influence of newcomers grows. 
In our model i  serves as an instrument, determined by the old insiders, of redistributing 
utility between old and new insiders. The old insiders consider their own utilities, and the 
outsiders’ utilities specified in section 6, for the various i ‘s, and decide which outsiders are 
offered union membership. Outsider i’s utility for that i  determines whether it accepts 
membership. The union prefers to adjust i  downwards to that minimum value 
min
i  where 
outsider i is indifferent between joining and not joining the union, given that the union 
members prefer the outsider to join for min
i . The value i =
min
i  maximizes the utilities of 
the old insiders. Lowering i  below 
min
i  means that outsider i prefers not to join. Increasing 
i  above 
min
i  means that outsider i prefers to join, earns an increased utility by joining, 
while the union members earn a lower utility than when i =
min
i . This kind of thinking is 
analogous to the principal-agent literature where the principal adjusts the salary to the agent 
downwards to that point where the agent is indifferent between accepting the employment and 
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choosing his outside opportunity, referred to as the individual rationality and incentive 
compatibility constraints. 
Distinguishing i  across the m newcomers allows for differential discrimination. For 
example, the union may choose a low i  for an outsider eager to join, ensuring its 
membership while reducing its eagerness, and a high i  for an outsider reluctant to join, to 
ensure its membership, assuming the union prefers the outsider in both cases. The union 
always prefer new members who accept i =0, since these have no influence while removing 
earlier regulatory diversity, as shown in (5) and Proposition 1. However, conversely, some 
outsiders may be so reluctant to join that even i =1 is not sufficient to ensure their 
participation. 
A low i for the m newcomers in effect divides a union into class A members (the old 
members) and class B members (the newcomers). In the case of successive waves of 
enlargement, ‘old’ newcomers will have greater status and influence than ‘new’ newcomers; 
that is, a first-wave member is assigned i1, a second-wave member gets i2, and the n’th-
wave member receives in. It can be assumed that all i ’s increase over time, where 
1i1i2…in. That is, discrimination can in a democratic setting usually be sustainable 
only in the transition, and the i ’s will thereafter increase to 1. 
Allowing for “differentiated membership” (Schneider 2005) is not merely a modeling device 
that allows union members to maximize their utility. Rather, the members of the European 
Union have typically used temporary membership restrictions for new members to reshuffle 
enlargement gains from accession countries to old members. In other words, discrimination of 
new members seems to be the rule rather than the exception.   
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Equation (9) states that the m new members will have an influence on the h regulations in the 
subsequent deepening. The reason for applying ( )kr M m  is that the m countries that became 
insiders now get the opportunity to influence the h additional regulations. 
The implication of (9) is that the second term in (4) splits into two terms, one with ( )kr M  for 
H regulations, the other with ( )kr M m  for h regulations. The first and third term in (4) 
remain unchanged, though we replace H with H+h and keep H+K to account for deepening. 
Widening before deepening gives 
1 1 1
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The discount parameter d  is multiplied by an expression summed over the subsequent 
deepening, that is, from k=H+1 to H+h. Inserting d =0 into (10) gives imhu = imu , where uim is 
defined in (4). This means that widening before deepening is equivalent to widening when the 
future has no value. 
Let us now compare the utility members derive from widening before deepening with the 
utility of deepening-only. In the case of widening, the m new members will be able to take 
part in the later harmonization of h regulations. Deepening-only means of course that 
harmonization remains in the hands of insiders. Subtracting (8) from (10) gives 
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For the special case d =1, (11) simplifies to 
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which is easier to interpret. The first term in (12) is always positive and is larger than equation 
(5) since the upper limit of the second summation sign is H+h in (12) in contrast to H in (5). 
Hence widening is beneficial for the insiders because accession countries accept all union 
regulations. However, the second and third terms may be positive or negative. Whereas (5) 
represents a safe strategy of widening with guaranteed utility gain for insiders, (12) suggests a 
more risky strategy. If (12) is positive, widening before deepening is preferable for the union 
members. This occurs when the second and third terms in (12) are small in absolute size 
compared with the first term. 
In the second term of (12) j runs over the remaining outsiders, that is from M+m+1 to M+N, 
while k runs over the h additional regulations, that is from k=H+1 to H+h. The second term 
(in square brackets) compares the deviation of the union’s agreement in harmonizing h 
regulations with and without the accession countries. The term in brackets equals zero if and 
only if the weighted mean of the outside countries’ h regulations is identical to the weighted 
mean of the inside countries’ h regulations. If the accession countries’ regulatory preferences 
in h deviate from that of the insiders, then the gains from enlargement become smaller for the 
insiders as a whole. Each insider, however, benefits if its preferences over h regulations are 
closer to the preferences of the mean accession country than those of the mean insider. 
Insiders with preferences more similar to the mean outsider than to the mean insider will 
profit from enlargement – all other old members will suffer a utility loss. This utility loss is 
largest for those insiders whose preferences lie farthest from those of the mean outsider.  
The third term in (12) is positive if ( )kr M  diverges more than ( )kr M m  from member i’s 
preference rik for the h regulations. This happens when the m new members have regulation 
preferences that lie closer to member i’s preferences. The last term multiplied with d  in (11) 
can be positive or negative, and hence (11) can also be positive or negative. 
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Although (11) and (12) suggest an increased overall tendency to prefer widening before 
deepening as the gap in regulatory preferences between insiders and outsiders decreases, each 
particular case has to be analyzed. Particularly controversial are cases where the insiders’ 
preferences vary greatly which may cause some insiders to prefer the adoption of outsiders 
with extreme preferences to move ( )kr M  in their preferred direction. That is, insiders with 
regulatory preferences lying between those of some old members and the applicant countries 
may support the outsiders’ demand for membership against the wishes of other insiders even 
if the outsiders’ preferences are far off. Consider the following examples: 
Example 1. In the first example we consider one regulation k (which means wik=1), two union 
members M=2 with regulation preferences r1k=0.1 and r2k=0.3 and one outside country with 
preference rjk=0.8 (which means N=h=1). With equal bargaining power p1k=p2k, equation (2) 
gives kr (2) =(0.1+0.3)/2=0.2. If, however, rjk is granted membership before members harmonize 
rik, the point of agreement becomes kr (3)=(0.1+0.3+0.8)/3=0.4.  







   
Figure 4a: Preference configuration and points of agreement (example 1) 
 
Figure 4a models a situation in which country 2 is indifferent whether to harmonize regulation 
k with country 1 alone or with country 1 and country j. The reason is that the distances from 
r2k to kr (2) , and from r2k to kr (3) , are equal. This means that country 2 is indifferent between 
options ‘widening before deepening’ and ‘deepening before widening’. In contrast, country 1 
prefers deepening before widening since the distance 0.1 from r1k to kr (2)  is 0.2 smaller than 
the distance 0.3 from r1k to kr (3) . 
Example 2. In the second example we consider a case with a slightly altered distribution of 
preferences r1k=0.0 and r2k=0.3 and an outside country with preference rjk=0.9; here countries 
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1 and j have moved away from country 2 by the same distance but in opposite directions. 
With equal bargaining power p1k=p2k=p3k, equation (2) gives (2)kr =(0.1+0.3)/2=0.15 before 
union enlargement, and (3)kr =(0.0+0.3+0.9)/3=0.4 after union enlargement. 








Figure 4b: Preference constellation and points of agreement (example 2) 
 
In Figure 4b, country 2 is now better off if j becomes a member before harmonization occurs, 
even though the distance to the outsider country j has increased. Country 2 prefers widening 
before deepening. The reason is that the distance from r2k to kr (2)  has increased from 0.1 to 
0.15, which is larger than the (unchanged) distance 0.1 from r2k to kr (3) .  
 
5.2. Deepening Before Widening 
The analysis of the second scenario, deepening before widening, begins with the assumption 
that the utility associated with deepening is correctly given by uih in equation (8). We discount 
the subsequent widening with discount parameter 
w , 0 1w  . 0i  . The parameter w  
is the only difference with the static case, and in this subsection there is no i  since ( )kr M  in 
(2) remains unchanged. Deepening before widening implies that accession countries will end 
up having to accept a wider set of harmonized regulations than in the case of widening before 
deepening. Newcomers thus will have less influence on future rule-making since fewer 
regulations will be left for future rounds of harmonization. In other words, subsequent 
widening implies that the m accession countries have to accept ( )kr M  for all the H+h 
regulations that the union has previously harmonized. Let us first set up the equation without 
 27 
discounting, that is 
w =1. By simply replacing M with M+m and keeping M+N in (6), we 
obtain the following utility for ‘deepening before widening’:  
1 1
M m H h
ihm ih w ik k jk
j M k
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The discount parameter 
w  is multiplied with an expression summed over the subsequent 
widening, that is, from j=M+1 to M+m. These m newcomers accept all the H+h regulations. 
Inserting 
w =0 into (13) gives ihmu = ihu , where uih is defined in (8). This means that   
‘deepening before widening’ is equivalent to ‘deepening-only’ when the future has no value. 
Let us now compare the utility of ‘deepening before widening’ with the utility of ‘widening-
only’. Subtracting (4) from (13) gives 
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(14) 
The first term runs over all M+N insiders and outsiders and is always positive, resulting in a 
gain for deepening. The second term is always negative and runs only over the remaining 
outsiders. If   kr M  equals rik for the h regulations, the second term cancels that part of the 
first term that runs only over the remaining outsiders. If, however, ( )kr M  lies closer than rik 
to outsiders’ preference rjk, then this yields a net benefit for option ‘deepening before 
widening’. As before, the last cost term is always negative. The third and fifth terms cancel 
when 
w =1. If w <1, ihm imu u  gets a lower value, reflecting that the relative advantage of 
‘deepening before widening’ over ‘widening-only’ is lower if less importance is attached to 
future widening. If 
w =0, (14) compares the advantage of deepening over widening. This 
implies that ‘widening before deepening’ can be more attractive for union members than 
‘widening-only’ even though these members will see their influence in future union matters 
decline. In fact, ‘widening before deepening’ is more appealing to insiders if the heterogeneity 
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between insiders and outsiders on already harmonized policies and regulations is large 
relative to the preference heterogeneity in the areas which the union members intend to 
harmonize in the future. In addition, ‘widening before deepening’ is more attractive to union 
members if the ratio of policies already harmonized to policies yet to be harmonized is large. 
 
5.3.  Comparing Widening before Deepening to Deepening before Widening 
Let us now consider the overall utility change when the insiders first widen and then deepen 
the union. Subtracting (3) – the status quo utility - from (10) – the utility derived for widening 
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Equation (15) reduces to (5) when 0d   since future deepening is discounted. For the three 
terms multiplied by d , the first term is positive (due to removal of regulatory diversity) and 
runs over all insiders and outsiders for the h newly harmonized regulations. The second 
negative term must be seen in connection with the first positive term for the remaining 
outsiders and h regulations. That is, the M+m insiders change from rik to  kr M m  with a 
net utility change that may be positive or negative. The third cost term is negative. 
Analogously, the overall utility change when the insiders first deepen and then widen is found 
by subtracting equation (3) from equation (13), i.e. 
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 (16) 
Equation (16) reduces to (7) when 
w =0 since the future widening is then discounted. When 
d = w =1, equations (15) and (16) are equivalent except that ( )kr M m  (widening before 
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deepening) is replaced with  kr M  (deepening before widening) in (15). The first term in 
(16) is always positive. Seeing the second term in connection with the first term, the M 
insiders change from rik to ( )kr M  with a positive or negative net utility change. The third 
cost term is negative. In the fourth positive term the m newcomers accept the H+h 
regulations. 
Unless the costs of harmonizing h additional regulations are prohibitively high or the gains 
from widening are large, ‘deepening before widening’ is a reliably attractive strategy for 
insiders M. The deepening before widening option dominates the deepening-only option 
because accepting new insiders is beneficial in our model and the benefits accrue 
proportionally to the level of harmonization prior to enlargement. However, each additional 
round of harmonization decreases the incentive for outsiders to join the union. A highly 
harmonized union poses formidable entry barriers which may deter outsiders. 
A comparison between ‘deepening before widening’ and ‘widening before deepening’ shows 
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The first term disappears when 
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   , (18) 
Of course, if the new members have no influence on the h regulations, so that 
 kr M m =  kr M , both terms in (18) are zero and the insiders are indifferent between 
‘deepening before widening’ and ‘widening before deepening.’ Assuming that all the M old 
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insiders have the same preference  kr M , and that all the N-m outsiders (those that remain 
outsiders after union widening) have the same preference rok, we can formulate the following: 
 
Proposition 1: Assume rik=  kr M  for all i=1,...,M, and rjk=rok for the N-m outsiders. The M 
old insiders prefer ‘deepening before widening’ when 
k okr ( M m ) r   is not too small 
compared with 
k okr ( M ) r - 
 
Proof: Inserting rik=  kr M , rjk=rok, and ihmu > imhu  into (18) implies 
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which gives Proposition 1. 
 
The nature of unions is such that old insiders often have common preferences, which suggests 
rik similar to  kr M . When insiders consider adopting m new members among the N 
outsiders,  kr M m  can on the one hand be further removed from rok (the average 
preferences for the N-m that remain outsiders), which means that  kr M  lies between 
 kr M m  and rok. This occurs when there is a plurality of preferences among the outsiders 
and the union succeeds in identifying those outsiders that have preferences similar to the old 
insiders. In this case (18a) is satisfied and the old insiders prefer ‘deepening before widening’. 
On the other hand,  kr M m  may lie between  kr M  and rok. This occurs when the N 
outsiders have more common preferences and any choice of m new members causes 
 kr M m  to lie in the direction of the N-m outsiders that do not join. Proposition 1states 
that the M old insiders may nevertheless prefer ‘deepening before widening’ if  kr M m  is 
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not positioned too much in the direction of rok and thus away from  kr M . The mathematical 
reason in (18a) is that when the first term is negative, the inequality is still satisfied provided 
that the absolute value of the first term is less than the absolute value of the second term. 
When Proposition 1 is not satisfied, the M old insiders do not prefer ‘deepening before 
widening’. 
Now, the more regulations the insiders harmonize without taking the preferences of the 
outsiders into consideration, the less attractive the union becomes for outsiders. The more 
regulated a union, the higher the price of joining; the higher the price, the lower the demand 
ceteris paribus. By analyzing the comparative statics of the game for the outsiders, we can 
understand when insiders oppose ‘deepening before widening.’ 
Let us finally consider an example where the M old insiders do not have the same preferences. 
Example 3. Let us use equation (18) to verify our previous two examples. With the numbers 
in Examples 1 and 2 the first term in (18) is zero since the lower limit j=2+1+1 is lower than 
the upper limit j=2+1. Inserting the numbers in Example 1 into the second term in (18) gives 




0 4 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 3 0 1 0
0 4 0 3 0 2 0 3 0
hm mh
hm mh
u u . . . . . . ,
u u . . . .




       
     
 (19) 
which shows that country 2 is indeed indifferent between ‘widening before deepening’ and 
‘deepening before widening’ since 
2hmu = 2mhu , while country 1 prefers ‘deepening before 
widening’ since 1hmu > 1mhu . Inserting the numbers in Example 2 into the second term in (18) 
gives 
   
   
1 1
2 2
0 4 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 4 0 15 0
0 4 0 3 0 15 0 3 0 1 0 15 0
hm mh
hm mh
u u . . . . . . ,
u u . . . . . . ,
   
   
 
 
       




which shows that country 2 prefers ‘widening before deepening’ since 
2hmu < 2mhu . Country 1 
still prefers ‘deepening before widening’, and more so in (20) than in (19) since >0. 
 
6 The outsider’s utility and discriminatory membership 
Demand for union membership by outsiders is never uniform and cannot be taken for granted. 
In a recent study on EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, for example, Mattli and 
Plümper argue that “leaders in more democratic regimes had a greater incentive to push ahead 
with (…) costly ‘institution-building reforms’ which, in effect, aligned their countries with 
EU rules and institutions. (…) The successful launching of (…) reforms naturally led these 
leaders to contemplate EU membership application; indeed, by submitting an application 
these leaders expressed confidence in their country’s ability and willingness to overcome the 
remaining internal obstacles to EU membership and work towards satisfying all membership 
requirements.” (Mattli/ Plümper 2002: 551)   
We similarly seek in this section to understand the varying stances of outsiders regarding the 
desirability of union membership in terms of their relative regulatory affinities with insiders. 
Let us use s, where s=M+1,…,M+m, for the m outsiders that consider union membership in a 
widening process. We keep j as before for countries that remain outsiders after union 
widening. Equation (3) applies for insider i, given that M insiders have harmonized H 
regulations. The analogous utility for outsiders contemplating membership is 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
M H M H K
s sk k sk sk sk jk
j k j k H
M N H M N H K
sk sk jk sk sk jk
j M , j ` s k j M , j ` s k H
u w r ( M ) r w r r




    
  
        
    
   
  
   
 (21) 
The first term can be simplified, and the last two can be combined to one term, which gives 
1 1 1 1 1
H M H K M N H K
s sk k sk sk sk jk sk sk jk
k j k H j M , j ` s k
u M w r ( M ) r w r r w r r
 
  
       
           . (22) 
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Let us first consider widening with m new members without subsequent deepening. The 
utility imu  of widening to M insiders is given by equation (4). The m new insiders get the 
same utility as in (4), substituting i with s, minus the cost of harmonizing H regulations. This 
gives 
1 1 1 1 1
M N H K M N H H
sm sk sk jk sk k jk k sk
j , j s k H j M m k k




        
            (23) 
Subtracting (22) from (23), we obtain the following utility change to each of the m outsiders 





sm s sk k sk sk sk jk
k j M , j ` s
M N
sk k jk k sk
j M m
u u Mw r ( M ) r w r r









    







The m outsiders prefer to join the union when the inquality is satisfied. The first and fourth 
terms must be seen jointly. Country s incurs a cost in the fourth term as a result of adjusting to 
kr ( M )  from skr ; however, it enjoys a benefit in the first term since the regulatory diversity 
has been removed and the benefit increases in the group size M. The second and third terms 
are also connected. The third term is the new cost of regulatory diversity toward the N-m 
remaining outsiders due to the change from skr  to kr ( M )  which is balanced by a 
corresponding benefit in the second term that runs over all the N outsiders before joining the 
group. 
If all the N outsiders have the same regulation preference skr = jkr  for the H regulations, then 
equation (24) simplifies to 
1
H
sm s sk k sk k sk
k




       
   (25) 
The first term is the benefit which increases in the group size M+m; it can be negative if 
outsiders are too numerous. The second term gives the cost of regulatory adjustment. 
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Let us then consider widening before deepening. This means that ( )kr M m  in equation (9), 
where i  plays a role, becomes relevant. Equation (10) gives the utility imhu  to the M old 
insiders. The m new insiders get the same utility as in (10), substituting i with s. Thus 
1 1 1
H h M N M N
smh sm d sk sk jk sk k jk k sk
k H j , j s j M m




      

         

   (26) 




H M N M N
smh s sk k sk sk sk jk sk k jk k sk
k j M , j ` s j M m
H h M N M N
d sk sk jk sk k jk k sk
k H j , j s j M m
u u Mw r ( M ) r w r r w r ( M ) r r ( M ) r






      
  
      
 
         
 






The m outsiders prefer to join the union when the inquality is satisfied. The first line in (27) is 
equivalent to (24). Hence (27) and (24) are equivalent when the subsequent deepening has 
zero value, that is when d =0. The first line in (27) runs over the H regulations, and the 
second line runs over the h regulations which are to be harmonized in the subsequent 
deepening.  
Let us then consider deepening before widening. Equation (13) gives the utility ihmu  to the M 
old insiders. The m new insiders get the same utility as in (13), substituting i with s, minus the 
cost of harmonizing the H regulations. Subtracting the cost of harmonizing the h regulations is 
already accounted for in (13). This gives 
1 1 1
M m H h H
shm sh w sk k jk k sk
j M k k




   
        (28) 




H h M N M m
shm s sk k sk sk k jk w sk k jk
k j M j M
M N H h M
sk sk jk k sk sk sk jk sk k sk
j M , j ` s k H j
u u Mw r ( M ) r w r ( M ) r w r ( M ) r






    
 
     

      

  






The m outsiders prefer to join the union when the inquality is satisfied. Equations (27) and 
(29) are equivalent when d = w =1 and ( )kr M m = ( )kr M , which makes it irrelevant 
whether widening occurs before deepening or vice versa. In all other cases, however, 
outsiders prefer ‘widening before deepening’ over ‘deepening before widening’. This suggests 
 
Proposition 2: The probability that an outsider will join a union declines when insiders 
increase the number of harmonized regulations before offering membership to the outsider. 
 
Insiders are likely to push such preliminary harmonization when their regulatory preferences 
deviate substantially from those of outsiders, reducing the chances of enlargement. The 
attraction of union membership declines further if changes in areas bound to be harmonized in 
the future are very costly. 
The finding in Proposition 2 that the probability of joining a union declines when union 
members increase the number of regulations before accepting new members begs the question 
of whether potentially higher gains can flow from joining a more deeply integrated 
(harmonized) union. That is indeed possible, and we illustrate it with an example. 
Example 4. Consider one regulation k which means wik=1, two union members M=2 with 
regulation preferences r1k=0.4 and r2k=0.6 and one outside country with preference rjk=0.2, 
which means N=h=1.  
2krjkr




Figure 5a: Preference configuration of two insiders and one outsider. 
 
Without harmonization, the regulatory diversity of the three countries is. 
Insider 1: 
1 2k kr r

 + 1k jkr r

 = 0 2.  + 0 2.   
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Insider 2: 









 + 2jk kr r

 = 0 2.  + 0 4.   
Assuming widening before deepening gives rk(3)=(0.2+0.4+0.6)/3=0.4 
 3kr
2krjkr




Figure 5b: Preference configuration and point of agreement: widening before deepening. 
 
The regulatory diversity of the three countries is zero.  
Insider 1: 0 
Insider 2: 0 
Outsider j: 0 
Such removal of regulatory diversity is beneficial for insiders if the cost of harmonization is 
not too large. This cost is 13k kr ( ) r

  =0 for insider 1 and 23k kr ( ) r

  = 0 2.   for insider 
2. Widening before deepening is always beneficial for outsider j which then influences rk(3) 
which causes lower cost of harmonization for outsider j. 
 
Assuming deepening before widening gives rk(2)=(0.4+0.6)/2=0.5 
 2kr
2krjkr




Figure 5c: Preference configuration and point of agreement: deepening before widening. 
 
The regulatory diversity of the three countries is then again positive.  
Insider 1: 2k jkr ( ) r

 = 0 3.   
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Insider 2: 2k jkr ( ) r

 = 0 3.   
Outsider j: 2jk kr r ( )

 + 2jk kr r ( )

 = 0 3.  + 0 3.   
 
Deepening before widening is beneficial for insiders if the cost of harmonization is not too 
large. This cost is 
12k kr ( ) r

  = 0 1.   for insider 1 and 22k kr ( ) r

  = 0 1.   0 for insider 2. 
The question is whether this is beneficial for outsider j. When =1, outsider j is indifferent 
between remaining an outsider, and deepening before widening, since 0 2.  + 0 4.  = 0 3.  +0 3.  . 
However, when >1, we have 0 2.  + 0 4.  > 0 3.  + 0 3.  . One example is =2, which gives the 
inequality 0.2>0.18. Now, if outsider j becomes an insider after deepening, it has to incur a 
cost 2k jkr ( ) r

   of harmonization as specified in (23). If =2, and 2k jkr ( ) r

  <0.02, 
then outsider j does indeed prefer to join a more deeply integrated (harmonized) union. 
 
7  Conclusion 
This study makes a first contribution in what is theoretically thoroughly unchartered territory. 
Much of the writings on the question of the relationship between widening and deepening are 
fed by impressions based on casual readings of prevailing facts narrowly focused on recent 
developments in European integration. No attempt is made in the literature to ponder the 
deepening versus widening issue more broadly, that is, with reference to examples beyond 
Europe, or more systematically, that is, by offering a comprehensive theoretical framework 
capable of generating insights into the complex and varying relationship between widening 
and deepening. Our study offers such a framework. We consider two two-stage games with a 
discount factor for the second stage, and one simultaneous game. We tackle the timely 
question of whether widening should precede deepening, or vice versa, or whether it is 
preferable to interchange widening and deepening in some incrementally prescribed manner. 
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It thereby also examines the implications of different scenarios both for union insiders and 
potential newcomers. We find, for example, that the incentive to pursue further regulatory 
harmonization within a union increases ceteris paribus with the regulatory diversity among 
insiders provided the effect of outsiders on the utility of insiders is small. The model also 
suggests that union members are more reluctant to opt for widening before deepening the 
more the mean regulatory preference of insiders deviates from the mean regulatory preference 
of outsiders in areas likely to become harmonized in the future. In contrast, members are more 
inclined to choose widening before deepening the more the mean regulatory preference of 
insiders deviates from the mean preference of outsiders in already harmonized areas. 
Our model is not restricted to the study of international unions but is applicable to other fields 
of research such as clubs (Cornes and Sandler 1996, Ellicksen et al. 2001), special interest 
organizations, coalitions, coalition formation (Chwe 1994), groups, intergroup migration 
(Hausken 2000), or other kinds of collective entities. Indeed, the trade-off between 
inclusiveness and exclusiveness of actor groups has gained wide attention within the social 
and biological sciences. Our model contributes to various discussions by illustrating how 
dynamic and exclusive groups evolve dependent on the conflicting concerns of increasing 
participation and ensuring harmonization within the group. The Union or group does not exist 
in isolation. Outsiders constitute various kinds of exogenous shocks to the union. Some such 
shocks can be mitigated if outsiders can be made to join the group. This alters both the group 
and the external environment. Outsiders have to be accepted by the insiders, and the outsiders 
may in varying degrees be required to accept the group membership criteria. Enlargement and 
harmonization may go hand in hand, enlargement may preclude harmonization, 
harmonization may preclude enlargement, or both may be precluded. This article has provided 
a framework for how to analyze such phenomena of widening and deepening. 
Future research may analyze more than two periods, allow the third option ‘to do nothing’ in 
addition to ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ in each period, allow ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ to 
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be negative (shrinkage of union size and abolition of harmonized regulations), allow these 
five options to be endogenously determined at various points in descrete or continuous time, 
introduce alternating regulations to address sustainability, reversal, etc., and address timing as 
well as sequencing. For example, sequencing may be determined as an outcome of collective 
decisions by insiders. 
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